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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss some of the most important economic issues raised in European 
Commission vs. Microsoft (2004) concerning the market for work group servers. In our view, 
the most important economic issues relate to (a) foreclosure incentives and (b) innovation 
effects of the proposed remedy. We discuss the economic basis for the Commission’s claims 
that Microsoft had incentives to exclude rivals in the work group server market through 
degrading the interoperability of their server operating systems with Windows. We also 
examine the impact of compulsory disclosure of information on interoperability and argue 
that the effects on innovation are not unambiguously negative as Microsoft claim. We 
conclude with some general implications of the case for anti-trust enforcement in high 
innovation sectors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The cases in the US and Europe against Microsoft have been perhaps the most 
high profile anti-trust cases in the last 20 years. In the various Microsoft cases, 
antitrust authorities in the US and Europe took on what was at some points the most 
valuable company in the world and its CEO Bill Gates, the world’s richest man. After 
5 years of investigation, on 24th March 20041, the European Commission held 
Microsoft guilty of an abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 and imposed the 
largest fine ever for such an antitrust violation in Europe – € 497 million. The 
Commission also demanded major forward looking behavioural remedies including 
compulsory licensing of intellectual property and forced unbundling. This degree of 
behavioural intervention is highly unusual and has led to continued conflict about the 
implementation of the remedies. 
The Decision found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in the PC 
operating system market in two ways:2  
• “deliberately restricting interoperability between Windows PCs and 
non-Microsoft work group servers, and 
• by tying its Windows Media Player (WMP), a product where it faced 
competition, with its ubiquitous Windows operating system.” 
As remedies for these violations the European Commission ordered Microsoft: 
• “within 120 days, to disclose complete and accurate interface 
documentation which would allow non-Microsoft work group servers 
to achieve full interoperability with Windows PCs and servers.” 
                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/microsoft/investigation.html downloaded 
30.1.07  
2 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/382&format=HTML&aged=1&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en downloaded 30.1.07 
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• “within 90 days, to offer to PC manufacturers a version of its Windows 
client PC operating system without Windows Media Player.”  
The case is fascinating as it touches on one of the key issues concerning the 
conduct of competition policy in the "new economy": How should we think about the 
role of anti-trust in high tech industries dominated by rapid innovation? 
In this chapter we give an overview of the economic issues in the Microsoft 
case. Space constraints mean that we focus on the part of the case relating to the work 
group server market. But we also touch on the media player case (see Kühn et al, 
2005, for a more detailed analysis). We also briefly contrast the European and U.S. 
Microsoft cases. Many of the economic issues and foreclosure mechanisms in the 
server case are closely related to those in the “Browser Wars” around which the US 
case was centered (see Rubinfeld, 2004, for a more detailed discussion of the 2001 
U.S case). 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in section 2 we look at the “Big 
Picture” and give a case overview. In Section 3 we sketch the timeline of the legal 
evolution of the case. Section 4 describes the products and Section 5 briefly looks at 
two topics that were extensively discussed in the case – interoperability and market 
definition. The next two sections are the economic meat of our discussion – the 
incentives to foreclose (section 6) and the impact of remedies on innovation 
incentives (Section 7). We make some concluding remarks on lessons learned in 
Section 8. 
 
2. THE BIG PICTURE 
Before plunging into the details it is worthwhile to have an overview of the case. The 
Commission’s essential argument was that Microsoft leveraged its market power from 
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its primary market for PC operating systems3 into the secondary, complementary 
market for work group server operating systems. In the terms of Article 82, it abused 
its dominance of PC operating systems to gain market power through the refusal to 
supply interoperability information.4 According to the Commission, Microsoft had the 
ability to do this because it controlled over 90% of the marker for PC operating 
systems (henceforth OS’es) and this monopoly was protected by a powerful 
“applications” barrier to entry (see Section 5).  
  Workgroup servers are low end servers that link with PC clients (see Section 3 
below for more on this). For the OS of work group servers to be effective they have to 
work well with the PC OS, which is dominated by Windows. Microsoft has the ability 
to reduce the interoperability of rival vendors of work group server OSes because it 
controls the interfaces (protocols, Application Programmer Interfaces known as 
APIs5) of the PC OS. This control of access to the functionality of the PC OS gives 
Microsoft the power to exclude potential rivals that produce complementary products 
to the PC OS by denying them access to the PC OS functionality. 
 Naturally, the ability to monopolise a secondary market does not mean a 
dominant firm has incentives to monopolise this market. The Chicago School tradition 
(e.g. Bork, 1978) emphasises that there are many efficiency reasons why the 
monopolist of market A will want to enter and monopolise market B (e.g. to solve the 
                                                 
3 The Commission also pointed to Microsoft’s dominant position in the supply of Personal Productivity 
Applications such as spreadsheets, word processing, etc, (i.e. the Office Suite). Although this aided 
their ability to limit interoperability, all of the economic arguments would carry through if these 
applications were controlled by a third party, so we focus on PC OS. 
4 The parallel case on the Windows Media Player alleged that Microsoft leveraged the market power 
derived from the PC operating system into the market for encoding software for media content. It did 
so by bundling decoding software (the core of the Windows Media Player) with the Windows operating 
system. 
5 Applications Programmer Interfaces are interfaces that an application programmer can use to have his 
application call up specific underlying functions of the operating system. They thus provide the link 
between the functionalities of the underlying operating system and the application that is written to the 
operating system. APIs are typically proprietary, so that an application has to be written to a specific 
operating system and cannot be used for a different operating system without substantial modification. 
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double marginalization problem arising in markets with complements) but there is no 
leverage of market power beyond what can be achieved in market A alone. The 
Commission argued that Microsoft’s incentives were not so benign and that there 
were anti-competitive reasons for degrading interoperability and monopolising the 
work group server OS market.  
 The Commission argued that there are both static and dynamic incentives to 
foreclose rivals from the workgroup server market. The dynamic reasons are probably 
most important as Microsoft was clearly concerned that a strong presence of rivals in 
the server OS market could threaten the profits it enjoyed from its Windows 
monopoly of the PC market in the future. For example, by running future applications 
mostly on servers customers could reduce their reliance on the PC OS functionality by 
effectively substituting server functionality for PC functionality  By extending the 
Windows platform dominance from the PC OS market to the server OS market, 
Microsoft could reduce the probability of such competition in the future (see Section 
6 for more details). 
Various internal e-mails by Microsoft senior executives suggest that this 
strategy was not conjured from thin air by the Commission. For example, in 1997 Bill 
Gates wrote “What we’re trying to do is use our server control to do new protocols 
and lock out Sun and Oracle specifically……..the symmetry that we have between the 
client operating system and the server operating system is a huge advantage for us” 
This may have just been cheap talk, of course, but Microsoft’s share of the 
work group server market did rise dramatically in the late 1990s from about 20% at 
the start of 1996 to over 60% in 2001 as shown in Figure 1. By this point Novell, the 
combined UNIX platforms (IBM, Sun) and Linux could muster only about 10% 
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market shares each. The Commission argued that at least some of the forty percentage 
point increase was due to anti-competitive actions. 
 
3. THE LEGAL TIMELINE 
The case began with a complaint by Sun Microsystems in December 1998 lodged 
against beta versions of Windows 2000. The complaint revolved around the limited 
interoperability of Windows with the OS of other server vendors due to a switch to 
proprietary communications protocols. These protocols were software interfaces 
which made it very difficult for non-Microsoft server OS to communicate with the 
Windows OS. Many of these protocols had been non-proprietary open standards when 
initially adopted by Microsoft (e.g. the Kerberos security protocol developed at 
M.I.T.), but gradually through often secretive extensions, became closed to rivals.  
These problems had been around for several years (since 1996 the arrival of NT 4.0 
and Windows 95). But the number of proprietary protocols had greatly increased with 
the new version Windows 2000.     
The Commission issued a Statement of Objections against Microsoft on 
August 1st 2000 taking up the complaints over the interoperability issues in the 
workgroup server market. It then issued a second Statement of Objections in August 
31st 2001 adding the media player issues, which the Commission had started to 
investigate on its own initiative. An (unprecedented) third Statement of Objections 
was sent out on 6th August 2003 refining some of the issues. The Oral Hearing took 
place between 12th and 14th November 2003 and in March 2004 the Commission 
issued its Decision finding Microsoft in violation of Article 82 and imposed the 
remedies.  
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Microsoft appealed against the decision in front of the Court of First Instance. 
It also sought interim relief, which would have suspended the implementation of 
remedies until a judgment on the appeal. However, this application was rejected by 
the Court of First Instance in December 2004. The appeals case was heard by the 
Court in 2006. On 17th September 2007 the Court upheld the Commission’s decision 
in just about every part6, although it did annul the role of the Monitoring Trustee (see 
below). Although Microsoft could still appeal, but it seems unlikely to do so.  
The remedies on the server side have been a point of contention between 
Microsoft and the Commission ever since the Court denied interim relief. Microsoft 
was required to make a full technical description available of the protocols and 
interfaces that would enable rival server OSes to fully interoperate with Windows. 
This raised complicated issues of the existence of intellectual property rights and 
compensation for Microsoft in form of “reasonable” licensing fees, as well the 
required scope of disclosures. 
To oversee the implementation of the remedy, the Commission appointed an 
independent Monitoring Trustee acceptable to both the Commission and Microsoft, 
Professor Neil Barrett. But both the Trustee and Commission came to the conclusion 
that Microsoft delayed the process and did not supply complete and accurate 
interoperability information. As a result, another Statement of Objections was issued 
on 21st December 2005. When the response to this statement of objections remained 
unsatisfactory for the Commission, Microsoft was fined another € 280.5 million for 
failing to comply with the Commission’s decision on 12th July 20067. Since the 
Decision prospectively also applies to future versions Windows, there have also been 
                                                 
6 http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eucase/docs/T-201-04EN.pdf 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/microsoft/implementation.html. downloaded 
31.1.07 
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ongoing discussions between the Commission and Microsoft about compliance with 
the decision in the new Vista OS. 
 
4. THE ROLE OF SERVERS IN MODERN COMPUTERS AND THE 
DEFINITION OF MARKETS FOR SERVER OPERATING SYSTEMS 
In the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s computing architecture went 
through a paradigm shift. The mainframe-orientated system was overthrown by the 
"PC client/server" computer architecture that is familiar today8. Instead of computer 
intelligence being centralised and users interacting via “dumb” terminals, processing 
power was more decentralised, distributed between PCs with their own operating 
systems and increasingly powerful servers linking these PCs together in networks.  
Computing can be performed locally on stand-alone appliances such as using a 
laptop computer away from the office.  Most computing, however, is performed on 
multi-user networks in which users communicate through ‘clients’ and in which much 
of the computing activity takes place behind the scenes on ‘servers’.  The clients in a 
client-server network take many forms.  Some are ‘intelligent,’ such as a desktop 
computer; others are ‘non-intelligent,’ such as a dumb terminal (e.g. an ATM 
machine).  Servers vary in size and in the nature of the tasks they are asked to 
perform.  The mixture of servers in a client-server network depends on the kinds of 
computing that the network is designed to support.  The server requirements of a 
small office, for example, are considerably different than the server requirements of a 
large international bank.   
Like all computers, servers consist of both hardware (e.g. the processors and 
storage facilities/memory) and software (e.g. the operating system and server 
                                                 
8 See Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) for an economic analysis of this transition. 
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applications).  Server hardware is manufactured using various types of processors.  
Intel processors are used in many servers, and Microsoft’s Windows operating system 
is compatible only with hardware that uses Intel processors.  Novell’s NetWare and 
SCO’s UNIX variants are also designed to run on Intel processors.  The leading 
hardware manufacturers for Intel-based servers include Compaq/HP, Dell and 
Gateway.  
Server vendors mostly sell Intel-based systems on a non-integrated basis. An 
organisation usually purchases server hardware from one vendor with the server 
operating system installed from another vendor. Sometimes the organization will 
install the server operating system itself.  Server systems are also sold on an 
integrated basis in which the vendor supplies both the server hardware and a 
proprietary operating system that has been specially designed for the vendor’s 
hardware (e.g. Sun Microsystems). 
Servers differ in the tasks they perform in a computer network. To understand 
how the requirements for servers differ depending on the different tasks involved we 
now discuss the most important functions performed by servers. These are needed to 
generate the benefits of using computer networks. 
One of the principal benefits of a computer network is that it allows an 
organisation to share computer resources among multiple users.  Clients connected to 
a network can share printers and files.  Application programmes can be maintained on 
central servers and then ‘served’ to clients on an as-needed basis.  In addition, 
computers connected to a network can run distributed applications.  Distributed 
applications are computer programmes in which different blocks of the programme 
are executed on different computers within the network.  Servers will facilitate these 
networking tasks. 
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So-called “workgroup servers” are used to perform a number of the basic 
infrastructure services needed for the computers in a network to share resources.  
Work group servers most commonly handle security (authorisation and authentication 
of users when they connect their clients to the network), file services (accessing or 
managing files or disk storage space), print services (sending print jobs to a printer 
managed by the server), directory services (keeping track of the location and use of 
network resources), messaging and e-mail, and key administrative functions in the 
management of the work group network. In addition to infrastructure services, work 
group servers also execute certain kinds of server-side applications.   
But there are also very different tasks performed by servers. In many 
organisations, there is a pressing need to manage enormous (and growing) amounts of 
data that are critical to the mission of the organisation.  Inventory control, airline 
reservations and banking transactions are just a few examples.  The ‘mission-critical’ 
data used for these purposes need to be stored, updated, quality controlled, and 
protected.  They also need to be readily available to authorised users. The servers that 
perform these mission-critical data functions are frequently referred to as “enterprise 
servers”.  Enterprise servers tend to be larger and significantly more expensive than 
work group servers.  Around 2001 a workgroup server usually had one 
microprocessor, modest memory (around four gigabytes) and typically provided 
services for between 25 and 35 clients.  Enterprise servers, in contrast, tended to have 
at least eight processors, usually cost more than $100,000 and in some circumstances 
can cost more than $1 million. The uses to which mission-critical data are put, and the 
methods by which they are stored, accessed and used, vary widely across 
organisations.  Thus, in contrast to the standardised applications that run on work 
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group servers, application programmes for enterprise servers tend to be custom 
written and specific to a particular organisation. 
The case focused on workgroup servers for several reasons. First, the 
protocols involved in the interoperability issues all focused on protocols used for the 
execution of workgroup server functions. These are protocols that are not necessarily 
used for the functions executed by enterprise servers. Second, since enterprise servers 
rely largely on customized software whole solutions tend to be customized, which 
requires less reliance on standardized interfaces than standardized applications 
programs do.  
 
5. SOME TECHNICAL ISSUES IN THE CASE 
Interoperability 
 The Commission gave many examples of where it believed Microsoft had 
limited interoperability. For example, the critical area of security services (e.g., 
authentication and authorisation) in Windows 2000 are based on a protocol called 
Kerberos.  Kerberos was developed in the 1980s at MIT and has been used since then 
on a number of open standard networks, mostly UNIX-based9.  Kerberos is a public 
protocol.  However, in implementing Kerberos for Windows 2000, Microsoft added 
proprietary extensions that create interoperability problems.  When presented with a 
                                                 
9 Simplifying, in a network that uses the Kerberos protocol; there is a server (the ‘Kerberos server’) 
that acts as a ‘trusted intermediary’.  When a user logs on to the network, the Kerberos server verifies 
the user’s identity and issues a ticket that, in effect, vouches for the user’s identity and specifies the 
network resources (e.g. files, printers, application programmes, databases, distributed objects) to which 
the user is allowed access.  Once issued, these Kerberos tickets can be used for authentication and 
authorisation around the network, as long as the user remains on-line.  One of the advantages of the 
Kerberos system is that authentication and authorisation can take place without the need to send 
passwords back and forth across the network -- a process that runs the risk of password theft. 
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Kerberos “ticket” (basically, a computer passport), the Windows 2000 server will 
only permit access to the services requested if the authorisation information appears in 
the Windows format.  Conversely, if a non-Windows 2000 server is presented with a 
Kerberos ticket in the Windows 2000 format, it cannot process the request for 
authorisation.  This means that, if a network wanted to use Windows 2000 on any 
machine it needs to run Windows on all of the servers or encounter significant 
burdens. Similar problems were alleged with other basic work group server tasks such 
as file and print (the CIFs protocol) and Directory services (Active Directory). 
  
 A great deal of discussion in the case centred on the factual question of 
whether or not interoperability between Microsoft and non-Microsoft OSes was really 
limited. Microsoft argued that interoperability was “good enough” – much 
information was disclosed and there were many ways to get around any compatibility 
problems through installing other “bridge” software (either on the PC client or 
server), reverse engineering, etc. In the end, talking to customers, survey evidence and 
expert testimony convinced the Commission that there were genuine serious 
compatibility issues. The key evidence was that bridge solutions were extremely rare 
and essentially never worked satisfactorily. The greatest barrier to such solutions is 
that they require considerable reverse engineering. However, such reverse engineering 
is slow and any success can be made completely obsolete through the next version of 
the Microsoft PC OS. Given the short product cycle in software products it appeared 
unlikely that satisfactory bridge products could work around the ever increasing 
interoperability problems.  
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In the end this issue was not central to the economic analysis of the case. As long as 
the interoperability problems created can significantly increase the costs of achieving 
interoperability with the PC OS by competing, foreclosure effects can be generated in 
the economic theories that support the case of the Commission. Interoperability 
restrictions by a dominant firm like Microsoft can then only be justified by efficiency 
benefits that are gained from restricting the access to protocol information.  
 
Market Definition 
As is usual in these cases, there was a huge amount of discussion concerning the 
existence or not of a market for work group servers OS. Although rather arcane to 
academic economists, market definition is usually a major issue in anti-trust cases.  
The really key issue in this case was not the work group server OS market, however, 
but rather the market for PC operating systems. The Commission’s theory asserted 
that Microsoft had monopoly power in PC OS and used this to leverage into other 
markets. So the critical issue was whether or not there was a well defined marker for 
PC OS. If this was not the case, attempts by Microsoft to use its power here would be 
swiftly undermined as many consumers could easily switch to rival PC OS vendors if 
they were unhappy with the reduced interoperability of Windows with their servers. 
  For PC OSes it appears clear that there is little substitutability between 
Windows and other operating systems. If a UNIX based PC operating system or even 
Apple’s OS would lower their prices by, say, 5% this can be expected to have a 
minute effect on the sale of Microsoft OSes. Part of the reason comes from an 
application network effect. There are a large number of software applications (e.g. 
Office type Word Processing, Spreadsheets, etc.) that are written specifically to the 
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Windows APIs. This means that these programs cannot easily be made to run on an 
alternative operating system, creating for users an enormous cost of switching the 
operating system. The failed attempt of IBMs OS/2 in the first half of the 1990s is an 
example how OS switching can be undermined because of compatibility problems 
with application software. On the basis of such evidence, it is highly unlikely that 
there is significant substitution in the period in question between Microsoft’s PC OS 
and that of other companies.  
 Microsoft pointed to the possibility of a disruptive entrant that could change 
the whole face of computing. They argued that the risk of such potential entry 
disciplined their behaviour. Theoretically, it is questionable whether this should be the 
case. Microsoft should only lower prices once competitive entry occurs. But 
Microsoft insisted that Linux was an example of price constraining competition. 
However, the example seemed to show the opposite. Linux achieves low penetration 
rates on PCs despite being priced very competitively: at zero price. This suggests that 
Microsoft’s dominance was unlikely to end soon. In the end, there was some 
consensus over Microsoft’s dominance of a well defined market for PC OSes among 
most commentators (even Microsoft did not contest this very strongly) 10.  
There was much more disagreement, however, over the workgroup server OS 
market.  As discussed above in section III there were clearly demand side 
characteristics that distinguished workgroup servers from more powerful enterprise 
servers. Prima facie these types of servers appeared to be at best very imperfect 
substitutes (or could even be considered complements in multi-tiered corporate 
                                                 
10 Although see the debate between Evans et al (2001) and Werden (2001) for some issues. 
 
 
15
 
computing networks). Recent econometric work seems to have confirmed this 
intuition11.  
Microsoft argued that software running on enterprise and workgroup server 
had to be considered perfect substitutes in terms of physical characteristics. They 
pointed to their own software that they used indistinguishably on any type of server. 
This argument is irrelevant for market definition if firms can discriminate in their 
pricing policies between different uses of a server operating system. Indeed, evidence 
was presented that Microsoft in fact price discriminated between workgroup, web, 
and enterprise server OSes by offering different licences at very different terms. In 
addition there was strong evidence that market shares differed strongly across these 
different server types. For example, the advance of Linux in server markets (see 
Figure 1) was somewhat limited to “edge” tasks like that of web serving rather than 
the core infrastructure tasks of workgroup servers like file, print, security and 
directory services. These pieces of evidence clearly demonstrated both that Microsoft 
had sufficient market power to price discriminate and that substitution in the 
workgroup server market was limited.  
The evidence on Linux finding a niche primarily on web servers also 
supported another important point on market definition. Web servers are not subject 
to the interoperability problems with Microsoft’s PC OS that workgroup servers are. 
The reason is that web serving is done using exclusively public (open) protocols. 
However, an operating system that can be sold for web serving or even as an OS for 
enterprise servers would find it difficult to prosper as a workgroup server because of 
the low interoperability between non-Microsoft enterprise OS and the PC OS. In a 
world of limited compatibility (and if this was not the case then the Commission had 
                                                 
11 See Van Reenen (2004, 2006) or Ivaldi and Szcolin (2006) 
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no argument at all) the markets could be effectively separated12 - even without 
reference to the price discrimination evidence.  
From an economic point of view, however, the existence or otherwise of a 
work group server market was largely a sideshow. Although Figure 1 and the 
arguments above suggest that Microsoft did have de facto market power in the work 
group server market, the Commission’s case did really not hinge upon this, as we will 
explain as we proceed to develop the theory of the case.  
 
 
 
 
6. KEY ECONOMIC ISSUES I: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO FORECLOSE 
As stressed in section II, a theory of incentives is critical for economists seeking to 
understand the case. Not all of these incentive based theories are clear from the 
Decision.  
 The One Monopoly profit theory  
 To see the issues at stake consider Figure 2. Firm A the monopolist (PC OS) 
faces firm B in a complementary market (server OS). When will firm A exclude firm 
B from the adjacent market?  Microsoft’s essential argument rested on the Chicago 
view that a monopolist in one market will never have anti-competitive incentives to 
leverage. The basic reason is the “One monopoly profit theory”. Degrading 
interoperability would cost Microsoft lost revenues as consumers would not be 
                                                 
12 The economic logic of this is compelling even though it may be troubling for lawyers as it mixes the 
abuse accusation with the market definition, two stages of the case that are usually considered 
independently. 
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willing to pay as much for a Windows OS for their PC due to its lower performance 
with non-Microsoft servers. Instead of going to the expense of attempted 
monopolization of servers through interoperability degradation, Microsoft could 
simply charge a higher price for its PC OS and extract all the rents from the server 
market in this way. Consequently, the entry of Microsoft into the server market must 
have benign reasons, such as its desire to end double marginalization (the excessive 
profits earned by oligopolistic server vendors) or the superior efficiency of Windows 
technology. 
There are many reasons why the Chicago critique of the leveraging theory 
breaks down that are addressed by modern foreclosure theory (See Rey and Tirole, 
2001, for a survey). For this case it is useful to distinguish between long-run 
(dynamic) and short-run (static) incentives in understanding why the standard 
Chicago argument will break down.  
Dynamic Incentives to foreclose 
The lack of any long-run incentive to foreclose in the “one monopoly profit 
theory” arises primarily from the assumption of the Chicago school that the 
monopolist has a permanent unchallenged position with no threat of future entry in his 
primary market. This assumption is unlikely to hold for Microsoft’s position in the PC 
OS market. Although in the short-run it is protected by the applications barrier to 
entry, in the longer-run a variety of threats existed to its stream of rents. Consumers 
desire a computer operating system for the applications it provides and Windows has 
the advantage that it has a wide range of applications written to its interfaces (APIs) 
due to its ubiquity. But major platform threats emerged in the late 1990s associated 
with the growth of the Internet. One version of the threat was that increasing numbers 
of applications could be delivered through servers and the need for a sophisticated and 
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expensive OS on the PC client would erode. Server OSes typically run on open 
standards (variants of UNIX) and APIs so developers could increasingly write to these 
standards and APIs rather than Windows. Since they are operating systems that have 
to support a similar range of applications as PC OSs, server operating systems can 
credibly be expected to offer a rich set of APIs to programmers. This would mean that 
the server OS became a potential alternative applications platform. This could then 
introduce effective competition into the PC OS market. If applications only needed a 
slimmed down version of the PC client OS users would not necessarily need PC OS 
upgrades to buy into new OS functionality supporting their applications. (this is why 
it was called the “thin client model”). Effectively, a server platform based on a server 
OS could have become a potential competitor for the PC platform running a Windows 
OS. One way to prevent this danger was for Microsoft to monopolize the server 
market through degraded interoperability - even if this meant in the short-run 
sacrificing profits. 
This dynamic argument is closely related to the U.S. “Browser Wars” case. 
There, Microsoft monopolized the market for web browsers by giving away Internet 
Explorer. The Department of Justice’s argument was that the web browser of the new 
entrant Netscape posed a threat to Microsoft not because it cared about profits of 
browsers per se, but rather because software developers were increasingly writing 
applications for Netscape interfaces (in conjunction with Java) rather than Windows 
interfaces. As the number of applications written to these non-Microsoft APIs 
increased, the applications barrier to entry in PC OS would weaken allowing new 
entrants into Microsoft’s primary monopoly. This argument is even more credible in 
the European workgroup server case, since a server operating system could even more 
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credibly expose a rich set of APIs to application program developers than Netscape in 
conjunction with Java.  
 There are other related dynamic incentives to monopolize the workgroup 
servers market because there are many other software markets that are complementary 
to servers and for which interoperability with servers is of great importance. These 
include web-enabled phones and PDAs. What is key about dynamic foreclosure 
theories is that an action that shifts short-run market share can have long-run benefits 
to the monopolist through depressing rivals’ investment and innovation incentives 
(for example, see Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Carlton and Waldman, 2002)13. In 
many cases these arguments may be suspect as there is no obvious mechanism 
whereby this could take place. In the Microsoft case the mechanism is well 
established due to the applications network effect. Shifts in share towards Microsoft 
in the server market (current and expected) will mean that developers will start 
switching away from writing to non-Microsoft interfaces. Customers will shift way 
from rivals because there are fewer applications and this will further reduce 
developer’s incentives to write software. This applications network effect makes 
foreclosure arguments much more plausible than in other industries. Note that 
developers’ incentives are reinforced by the incentives to invest in innovation. Falling 
share will, in general, mean that rival server vendors have lower incentives to invest 
in improving their software which again will lower their attractiveness to customers in 
a “vicious circle” of decline. 
Static Incentives to foreclose 
The dynamic arguments work even though, in the short run, the monopolist 
may suffer some losses. However, foreclosure arguments are even more compelling 
                                                 
13 See also Whinston (1990, 2001) 
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when there are short-run incentives to foreclose. One short-run incentive effect is the 
desire to more effectively use second degree price discriminate in the primary market 
(in this case the PC’s OS) through monopolizing the secondary market. Such 
imperfect price discrimination possibilities are assumed away in the One Monopoly 
Profit theory as it relies on the monopolist’s ability to fully extract all the rents from 
the primary market. This assumption is generally not satisfied because monopolists 
cannot perfectly price discriminate due to arbitrage. Large businesses with less elastic 
product demand, for example, can pretend to be small businesses when they buy their 
computers. 
In the context of the Microsoft case consider the idea that there are two types 
of customers, large firms (who are less sensitive to the price of the PC OS) and small 
firms (who are very sensitive to the price of the PC OS). A price discriminating 
monopolist would like to charge a high price to the large firms and a low price to the 
small firms. Arbitrage will limit the ability to do this however, so that systematic 
differential pricing of PC Oss is typically not possible among different businesses. 
But consider the case that large firms also place a high valuation on a complementary 
product – servers - whereas small firms do not because the gains from sharing 
computing resources are smaller. In this case, by monopolizing the server market and 
charging a higher price for the PC and server OS bundle, the PC OS monopolist 
effectively “restores” second degree price discrimination in the primary market14.  
From a welfare perspective price discrimination has ambiguous effects 
because output may rise. But in this case the welfare effects are likely to be negative 
as reducing interoperability immediately degrades the quality of rival products and 
causes a welfare loss to consumers who purchase those goods.  
                                                 
14 These ideas are formalized and tested for the PC and server markets in Genakos, Kühn and Van 
Reenen (2006). There does appear to be evidence that this incentive matters for Microsoft’s behaviour. 
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Both long-run and short-run incentives are part of modern foreclosure theory. 
Although often expressed legally in the language of “acquiring profits” in the 
secondary market, foreclosure is really about extracting rents more effectively from 
the monopolist’s primary market both today and in future periods. 
 
6. KEY ECONOMIC ISSUES II: REMEDIES AND INNOVATION 
 Software markets are fast moving and highly innovative and some new 
economy advocates have suggested that existing European Competition law is 
inadequate in such markets. In particular, Microsoft argued that the proposed 
remedies of forced disclosure of interoperability information would have a severely 
negative effect on innovation as it would lead to the wholesale “cloning” of 
Microsoft’s valuable intellectual property. Whatever the supposed short-run gains, 
they argued that the long-run costs in terms of lower innovation by Microsoft would 
swamp these purported benefits. 
 These are legally difficult areas as the Commission was under no legal 
obligation to consider the effects on innovation, despite their economic importance. 
They chose to do so however and claimed (Commission, 2004, ¶ 783)  “…. a detailed 
examination of the scope of the disclosure at stake leads to the conclusion that, on 
balance, the possible negative impact on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is 
outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole industry” 
 In order to consider these claims we must investigate what the Commission’s 
remedies and their likely impact on innovation incentives on Microsoft, on its rivals 
and therefore on the market as a whole. It is worth bearing in mind that there is no 
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theoretically unambiguous answer to these inherently difficult – but important – 
questions. 
What did the Commission ask for in its Remedies? 
The Commission asked Microsoft to reveal interoperability information (interfaces, 
protocols, etc.) necessary to allow rivals to interoperate with Microsoft’s Windows 
platform. This amounts to a compulsory licensing remedy. The Commission conceded 
that Microsoft could charge a reasonable fee for such licenses reflecting the 
intellectual property embedded in the information. An independent Monitoring 
Trustee was chosen to arbitrate on the appropriate degree of information and 
Microsoft was left with the choice of how best to allow this to occur subject to the 
reasonableness of the licensing conditions (we discuss what “reasonableness” might 
mean below). 
It is worth noting an important analytical distinction between demanding 
information to enable interoperability compared to imitation. The Commission wants 
the former to enable firms to connect to Microsoft’s PC OS monopoly in the same 
way telecom regulators force fixed line incumbents to share their network with firms 
selling complementary services even if the incumbent also offers these services (such 
as mobile telephony where the fixed line incumbent often also operates in the mobile 
market).  Another analogy would be that a monopolist of cars was required to disclose 
how rival tire manufacturers would be able to be compatible with the wheels of the 
car. If the remedy allowed imitation - of the key security features of the PC OS – there 
would be a stronger concern over innovation. Consequently, the remedy did not 
require release of Windows source code – the “crown jewels”.  
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Interestingly, windows source code is not what the rival server vendors wanted 
in any case. Instead they were after a detailed technical description of the interfaces to 
enable them to design their own code to interoperate with Windows. The description 
of the remedy as allowing “cloning” is therefore inaccurate. There was no desire to 
obtain what software engineers describe as the “implementation”15. Indeed, use of the 
information beyond that necessary for interoperability would be a violation of 
intellectual property rights by the rival server OS producers. 
 
Effects of the remedy on the incentives of server OS rivals to invest in 
innovation (R&D) 
The remedy effectively reduces the price for some interoperability features from 
infinity to a price that would lead to rivals being able to offer interoperable solutions. 
The main effect of giving interoperability information to rivals is that the level of 
interoperability with Microsoft products increases making rival products more 
valuable, increasing their sales. This will increase their return to R&D (relative to the 
world without interoperability information) as any innovation will be spread over a 
larger number of units sold. The remedy essentially reduces the cost of rival 
innovation and should, therefore, increase innovation incentives. 
Secondly under the remedy, rivals would no longer have to incur costs to 
overcome barriers to client-server interoperability created by Microsoft’s disclosure 
policy. This includes creating bridge software, etc. This is an innovation of a sort, but 
it is duplicative and socially wasteful. 
                                                 
15 An issue arises whether providing interoperability information would of necessity reveal so much 
that rivals could imitate. This can be protected by technical and legal provisions. Part of the “necessity” 
reflects Microsoft’s own design decisions of its software, however. 
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Both of these effects should increase rivals’ R&D incentives to improve quantity 
and quality of their productive innovations. 
Effects of the remedy on Microsoft’s incentives to invest in innovation 
Again there are several considerations. First, with better disclosure, rivals will be 
able to compete on a level playing field. To the extent that this reduces the expected 
market share and increases price competition from now higher quality rival products 
the remedy may lead to some reduction in Microsoft’s incentive to invest. However, 
unlike its rivals, Microsoft will still obtain substantial profits from general operating 
system innovation in the PC OS market, where it will continue to enjoy a monopoly 
position. There is therefore little reason to expect that Microsoft’s incentives to 
innovate on OS solutions would substantially fall. 
A further effect may also contribute strongly to increased innovation incentives: 
Through innovation a firm can escape harsh competition with rivals and secure rents 
for a transitory period. This effect will tend to increase the investment incentives of 
all firms including Microsoft. The theoretical and empirical literature is somewhat 
ambiguous on the net impact of all of these effects, but on balance it is believed that 
intensifying competition will usually lead to increased innovation (e.g. Vives, 2005).16 
Finally, Microsoft may change the quality as well as the quantity of its R&D. 
There could be positive effects on quality because Microsoft will no longer have 
incentives to block innovations that raise quality but have high interoperability with 
non-Microsoft servers. There is some evidence that Microsoft has sacrificed its own 
innovative potential (especially in areas where the innovations would be cross-
                                                 
16 There is some support for the notion that in high innovation industries like OS software the intensity 
of innovation is enhanced by more competition. An example comes from the computer industry:  
Macieira (2006) estimates that in the supercomputer industry an increase in competition would not only 
increase the rate of innovation of the industry as a whole but also the rate of innovation of the industry 
leader.  
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platform) in order to protect the Windows desktop monopoly. This was known 
internally to Microsoft as the Windows “strategy tax” – the need to close down 
research lines that, although leading to innovative products, could potentially weaken 
the lock-in of Windows17.  
In summary, there are likely to be positive effects on rivals’ innovation from 
the remedy and ambiguous effects on Microsoft’s incentives. While no one can sign 
the eventual outcome, the discussion highlights that it is far from clear that the 
remedy will chill industry-wide innovation. There are as many reasons for believing 
that it could have a positive effect on aggregate innovation. 
Interoperability at what Price? 
The most contentious issue after the Commission Decision have been the 
conditions under which the interoperability information should be licensed and what 
information was necessary to achieve full interoperability. The Commission left the 
exact conditions out of its initial decision because it involved intricate review of 
technical information which was beyond the scope of the investigation and which was 
delegated to the Monitoring Trustee. 
Microsoft’s initial suggestions were far from acceptable to industry rivals, the 
Commission and the Trustee. Microsoft proposed that the protocol and interface 
information could only be purchased as one bundle and specified a licence fee for 
each rival software copy shipped in the order of magnitude of the Microsoft software 
itself. This would have clearly continued the exclusive effect simply through high 
prices. Indeed, the position of rivals was far removed from this. Many industry 
insiders doubted that any innovation of significance was embedded in the interfaces 
                                                 
17 See Banks (2001). For example `Many of Microsoft’s best innovations were killed before they ever 
came to market. Inside Microsoft such sacrifices were known as paying the “strategy tax” ’ (p.71) 
 
 
26
 
themselves. Just changing the language of the protocol would not be a substantive 
innovation that had material value and therefore should not be compensated. Indeed, 
to the extent that Microsoft has innovation embedded in processes that use the 
protocols such innovations should not matter for the assessment of the license fee 
because the protocols themselves do not constitute the innovation. Typically interface 
and protocol information in other software sectors are licensed at only nominal fees so 
that the demands of Microsoft appeared by far exaggerated.  
 
 A second contentious issue is the amount and type of information that 
Microsoft has to provide. To interconnect with Microsoft’s software rivals do not 
need code, which no one could interpret, but information about how exactly the 
interface works. When the Trustee strongly stated that Microsoft was not forthcoming 
with sufficient information to make this possible, the Commission stepped in with a 
Statement of Objection and eventually the large fine for non-compliance. However, 
this tug of war has led to considerable delay in the effective implementation of the 
remedy, which would be in the interest of Microsoft if the practice did indeed have 
significant exclusionary effects. 
 
VII THE MEDIA PLAYER PART OF THE CASE 
While in the general public the case against bundling the Windows Media Player with 
the PC OS has been perceived as another case analogous to the US Browser War case 
this is in fact not the case. The rival Real Player, unlike the combination of the 
browser and Java, was unlikely to ever expose a rich enough set APIs to programmers 
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to credibly develop into an alternative operating system platform. The theory of the 
case is therefore quite different from that of the workgroup server part of the case. 
 
The Media Player case is really about competition for clients that produce media 
content. To such clients Microsoft and Real sell at considerable prices software 
solutions that encode media content into proprietary digital media formats that make 
files transferable over the internet and may allow media streaming. Media content 
providers themselves sell the media content to the desktops of individuals. There are 
large benefits to content providers to specialise on one format, not the least because of 
the technical support involved. Besides quality characteristics like transmission speed 
that is influenced by the format and the encoding software media content providers 
also care about how many desktops they can easily reach. This depends on whether 
the desktop already has a decoder for the particular format installed or not. By 
bundling Windows Media Player with the PC OS, Microsoft assured ubiquity on the 
desktop, a property that rivals have to struggle with. This gives Microsoft a 
competitive advantage and market power in the market for encoding software that has 
nothing to do with the actual quality of its product.18  
 
 A remedy for this case could have come from ordering total unbundling and 
prohibitions on exclusivity contracts with OEM manufacturers of PCs. This would 
have then allowed PC users to decide on the set of Media Players they wanted loaded 
on their desktop at the time of purchasing the computer. Alternatively, Microsoft 
                                                 
18 A more detailed discussion of this part of the case can be found in Kühn, Stillman, and Caffarra 
(2005) 
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could have been forced to allow the loading of all three decoders, i.e. Media Player, 
Real Player, and Quicktime when the machine was shipped.19  
 
 Unfortunately, the Commission chose a remedy that did not address the basic 
issues. Instead of an unbundling measure the Commission forced Microsoft to sell a 
version without Media Player but also allowed selling a version with Media Player. 
Microsoft then has incentives to sell both at the same price. A customer can then only 
gain by buying a version with Media Player and the ubiquity advantage of Microsoft 
in the market for encoding software is preserved. The basic anticompetitive issue in 
this part of the case was therefore not resolved by the remedy. 
 
VIII CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have focused on the work group server part of the European 
Commission vs Microsoft (2004) case, which is perhaps the most high profile 
European anti-trust case of all time. Microsoft was found to be in violation of Article 
82 of the Treaty of Rome through abusing its dominant position. It was fined and 
instructed to meet several behavioural remedies including compulsory licensing of 
information to enable rivals to inter-operate with its operating system. 
We end with some remarks on the case and suggest that there may be more 
general lessons to be learnt about anti-trust enforcement in high tech markets and 
elsewhere. 
                                                 
19 Although there are many other media players there are only these three that have decoders for their 
own, proprietary, format. When they play files they actually use the decoders of the other programs in 
the background. For example, Real Player does not “play” Windows Media Files. It simply calls up the 
Windows Media Player to decode the file and then displays the video in the Real Player frame. In 
contrast to proprietary interfaces there are large gains from making media formats proprietary because 
on those there is considerable innovation. 
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First, it is worth remembering that the case has gone on for nine years with 
three Statements of Objections issued and still no final resolution. This is partly a 
reflection of the complexity of the technical issues, legal necessity of due process and 
the financial strength of the Microsoft Corporation. Many of the server rivals have 
long since died. An obvious problem is that the legal timescale is so long compared to 
the rapid evolution of these markets. By the time a remedy is in place, the 
marketplace has moved quickly beyond the problems over which the case was fought.  
Even if the judgement and remedy are appropriate is it “too little too late”? On the 
other hand, some impact may have been retained because the Commissions decision 
is prospective so that it gives the Commission leverage over all future Windows 
versions. 
 
Furthermore, we believe that, although caution is always warranted before 
intervention, anti-trust authorities cannot take a completely laissez-faire approach to 
innovation markets.  Much of the positive impact of competition policy is through 
deterring anti-competitive behaviour without the need for ever taking legal action. In 
fact, software markets are replete with examples of similar complementarity issues 
and the case may have contributed to higher deterrence effect against anticompetitive 
exclusionary behaviour. 
A second observation concerns the status of foreclosure theory. Part of the 
Commission’s case was an explicit consideration of economic incentives and an 
analysis of the effects of the remedy on innovation. These are clearly important from 
an economic perspective, even though European legal practice is often ambivalent 
about getting into these issues. Despite the difficulty of bringing empirical evidence to 
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bear compared to say, a standard share calculation in a market definition exercise20, 
consideration of innovation and foreclosure was unavoidable in making a credible 
economic case. One of the challenges facing modern economics is to develop 
guidelines for the type of empirical evidence that could be used to test the likelihood 
of foreclosure being a problem in different markets. 
The European Commission has come in for much criticism in its use of 
foreclosure theories in merger cases. For example, the Commission blocked the 
proposed merger of General Electric and Honeywell after it had been cleared by the 
U.S. authorities only to see their judgement (although upheld) severely criticised the 
Court of First Instance in 2005 (see Vives, 2007). In 2002 the Court actually 
overturned the Commission’s blocking of the Tetra/Sidel merger in 2001 which was 
based on over-speculative theories. In a sense, foreclosure theories in a merger case 
are inherently highly speculative. Opponents of the merger must produce arguments 
that a particular type of foreclosure behaviour is more likely to occur as a result of the 
merger, although there are no exclusionary practices in the pre-merger situation. The 
evidential position is better in an abuse of dominance case because the exclusionary 
behavior is already alleged to have happened, so there can be an empirical discussion 
over whether the behaviour has in fact occurred, whether it could have pro-efficiency 
justification and whether there was any material effect on the marketplace as a result 
of this behaviour. This was the case in Microsoft where an ex post evaluation was 
possible. Furthermore, the exclusionary mechanisms of Microsoft were lent 
credibility by internal e-mails from senior executives. This is the type of evidence that 
is rarely seen but is legally persuasive. 
                                                 
20 Or more sophisticated attempts at market definition and merger analysis using econometrics such as 
Hausman et al (1994). 
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Unfortunately, although foreclosure may be easier to detect in an Article 82 
case compared to a merger case, remedying the problem is much harder. In a merger 
there is always the clear choice of simply blocking the proposed transaction. 
Remedies under Article 82 are harder to frame and even harder to enforce. The 
Commission and Microsoft have been in long-standing wrangling over the terms of 
the disclosure remedy and it is still not the perceived to be effective21. Microsoft’s 
main rivals have reached out of court settlements, so one concern may be that smaller 
firms and potential new entrants could be the main parties to suffer. Most importantly, 
this type of settlement does not necessarily help consumers of computer software. 
We are unlikely to have heard the end of this case. 
                                                 
21 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5153570.stm downloaded 30.1.07 
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 Figure 1: The growth of Microsoft’s share in the work group Server market 
1996-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IDC Quarterly Server Tracker 
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Figure 2: Leveraging Incentives 
 
 
